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PatientswithCapgras syndrome (CS) adopt the delusional belief that personswell-known to
them have been replaced by an imposter. Several current theoretical models of CS attribute
such misidentiﬁcation problems to deﬁcits in covert recognition processes related to the
generation of appropriate affective autonomic signals. These models assume intact overt
recognition processes for the imposter and, more broadly, for other individuals. As such, it
has been suggested that CS could reﬂect the “mirror-image” of prosopagnosia.The purpose
of the current study was to determine whether overt person recognition abilities are indeed
always spared in CS. Furthermore, we examined whether CS might be associated with any
impairments in overt affective judgments of facial expressions. We pursued these goals
by studying a patient with Dementia with Lewy bodies (DLB) who showed clear signs of
CS, and by comparing him to another patient with DLB who did not experience CS, as well
as to a group of healthy control participants. Clinical magnetic resonance imaging scans
revealed medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) atrophy that appeared to be uniquely associated
with the presence CS.We assessed overt person recognition with three fame recognition
tasks, using faces, voices, and names as cues.We also included measures of conﬁdence
and probed pertinent semantic knowledge. In addition, participants rated the intensity of
fearful facial expressions.We found that CS was associated with overt person recognition
deﬁcits when probed with faces and voices, but not with names. Critically, these deﬁcits
were not present in the DLB patient without CS. In addition, CS was associated with
impairments in overt judgments of affect intensity. Taken together, our ﬁndings cast doubt
on the traditional view that CS is the mirror-image of prosopagnosia and that it spares
overt recognition abilities. These ﬁndings can still be accommodated by models of CS
that emphasize deﬁcits in autonomic responding, to the extent that the potential role of
interoceptive awareness in overt judgments is taken into account.
Keywords: Capgras syndrome, Lewy body dementia, interoceptive awareness, person recognition, affect
perception
INTRODUCTION
Misidentiﬁcation syndromes are among the most fascinating
and puzzling forms of memory problems that can result from
psychiatric or neurological disease. They are monothematic
delusions that have intrigued psychologists and philosophers
alike for over a century, but have only recently been brought
into the realm of scientiﬁc investigation. Misidentiﬁcation syn-
dromes have been observed in relation to places, objects, and
people, and have become known collectively as “delusions of
misidentiﬁcation.” Perhaps the most striking condition is Cap-
gras syndrome (CS), in which individuals come to adopt the
delusional belief that persons well-known to them have been
replaced by an impostor or a “double.” A deﬁning characteris-
tic of delusions that is also present in CS is that patients will
ﬁrmly hold on to their delusional beliefs in the presence of
mounting contradictory evidence. While commonly observed in
the context of psychiatric disease, CS can also result from var-
ious neurological conditions. The purpose of the current study
is to shed more light on the nature of cognitive and affective
deﬁcits associated with CS in the context of neurodegenerative
disease.
CAPGRAS SYNDROME: A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR
UNDERSTANDING FUNCTIONAL IMPAIRMENTS
Given its close association with psychiatric illness (e.g., paranoid
schizophrenia and other psychoses), it was thought for many years
that CS is the result of abnormal psychodynamic processes. How-
ever, research conducted over the past 40 years has attempted to
ground CS symptomatology in brain-based dysfunction within
face-processing and person recognition models (Ellis et al., 1997;
Ellis and Lewis, 2001). In this newer endeavor, it has been
hypothesized that patients can normally map faces onto stored
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representations of known individuals based on computations per-
formed within structures of the ventral visual pathway (Bauer,
1984; Bauer and Verfaellie, 1988; Ellis and Young, 1990; Ellis
et al., 1997; Ellis and Lewis, 2001). Critically, however, recogni-
tion processes computed within a second pathway, which diverges
after initial structural analysis and allows for the generation of
an appropriate affective signal to familiar individuals, is proposed
to be impaired. This second pathway is thought to be comprised
of limbic structures, such as the amygdala, and possibly frontal
regions, including the insula and anterior cingulate cortex (Breen
et al., 2000). Alternatively, it has been suggested that CS could
result from a disconnection between ventral visual structures and
limbic structures dedicated to affective processing. Evidence in
favor of accounts that link CS to affective processing has come
from a handful of case studies in patients with CS caused by a
variety of etiologies, which revealed reduced autonomic responses
[as measured by skin conductance responses (SCRs)] to pictures
of personally known individuals and of famous people (Ellis
et al., 1997; Hirstein and Ramachandran, 1997; Brighetti et al.,
2007). Based on these ﬁndings, it has been hypothesized that the
monothematic delusional belief that characterizes CS is a result of
the patients’ attempt to“make sense”of the absence of an expected
affective signal (e.g., Young, 2008).
In functional terms, the “cognitive” and “affective” routes to
face recognition described above have been suggested to underlie
overt and covert aspects of face-processing, respectively (Tranel
and Damasio, 1985, 1988; Bauer and Verfaellie, 1988). Overt
face recognition refers to the ability to make accurate explicit
recognition judgments for faces, whereas covert face recogni-
tion refers to signs of an implicit differentiation between familiar
and unfamiliar faces in behavior, or most pertinent in the con-
text of CS, at the level of autonomic responding. Evidence
in favor of this distinction has come from neuropsychologi-
cal patient studies that revealed a double dissociation between
these two forms of face recognition (Tranel et al., 1995). Speciﬁ-
cally, bilateral lesions to ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)
have been shown to disrupt covert face recognition, as assessed
using SCR, while leaving overt face recognition intact. By con-
trast, bilateral lesions to occipito-temporal cortex resulted in
impairments in overt but not covert face recognition judg-
ments (see also Bauer, 1984; Tranel and Damasio, 1985; Bauer
and Verfaellie, 1988, for similar ﬁndings in other prosopag-
nosic patients). The preservation of covert face recognition in
prosopagnosic patients also stands in contrast to ﬁndings of
impaired covert face recognition, as reﬂected in reduced SCR
responses, in CS (Ellis et al., 1997; Hirstein and Ramachan-
dran, 1997; Brighetti et al., 2007). Indeed, some researchers have
endorsed the view that the face recognition deﬁcits in CS are the
mirror-image of those observed in prosopagnosia (Ellis and Lewis,
2001).
According to the two-factor framework of delusions, deﬁcits
in affective reactivity in face recognition may not provide a full
account of CS (Coltheart, 2010; Coltheart et al., 2011). Coltheart
(2010) has argued that such deﬁcits in isolation cannot explain
why CS patients typically remain ﬁrmly wedded to their delu-
sional beliefs, even when strong counter-evidence (e.g., a wedding
band with engraving) is presented. To explain these observations,
Coltheart (2010) proposed that CS involves an additional deﬁcit in
executive control processes that are necessary for monitoring the
contents of memory retrieval, as well as the critical evaluation of
hypotheses. Evidence in support of this idea comes from observa-
tions that many cases of CS, and other delusions, have been found
to be associated with right prefrontal cortical damage (Alexander
et al., 1979; Staff et al., 1999; Corlett et al., 2007; Devinsky, 2009;
Ismail et al., 2012; Thiel et al., 2014). Regardless of whether a sec-
ond factor is required to explain CS (see Corlett et al., 2010, for
critique), the two-factor model as well as previous single-factor
models (e.g., Breen et al., 2000; Ellis and Lewis, 2001) emphasize
the presence of a deﬁcit in covert familiarity responses that leaves
overt person recognition judgments intact. Here we examine this
central notion in the literature on CS more closely.
NATURE AND EXTENT OF PERSON RECOGNITION DEFICITS IN
CAPGRAS SYNDROME
When thinking about the functional impairments that charac-
terize CS, perhaps the most critical issue is the extent to which
person recognition is affected. What appears puzzling, at least at
ﬁrst glance, is that the delusion appears to be restricted to one
or a small number of individuals who typically have close emo-
tional bonds to the patient. However, it would seem premature to
conclude solely based on the scope of the delusion and anecdotal
reports from relatives that abnormalities in person recognition are
indeed restricted to loved ones. Rather, this issue requires system-
atic investigation of person recognition abilities with controlled
experimental tasks.
Recent psychophysiological research in healthy individuals has
demonstrated that exposure to faces of loved ones is associ-
ated with a larger autonomic response than exposure to other
well-known people as reﬂected in SCR, heart rate, and other psy-
chophysiological measures (Vico et al., 2010; Guerra et al., 2011,
2012). However, the generationof autonomic arousal is not unique
to exposure to loved ones in person recognition. In fact, several
studies have revealed increased autonomic arousal for famous peo-
ple as compared to unfamiliar people as well (Tranel et al., 1985;
Bauer and Verfaellie, 1988; Stone et al., 2001), and there are anec-
dotal reports that even a single exposure to a new face in the
study phase of an experimental recognitionmemory paradigmcan
lead to differential SCR responses during subsequent recognition
judgments (Morris et al., 2008).
Findings from experimental research with affective priming
paradigms in healthy individuals suggest that autonomic arousal
responses may even play a role in overt recognition judgments for
the identity of faces (Goldinger and Hansen, 2005; Duke et al.,
2014). For example, Goldinger and Hansen (2005) found that
presenting a subtle vibrating tactile stimulus (a “buzz”) simul-
taneously with test items during a recognition memory test led
to an increased endorsement of new faces as “old.” Following
a similar rationale, Duke et al. (2014) demonstrated that the
subliminal presentation of affective information (i.e., a happy
face) prior to a test probe (i.e., an emotionally neutral face)
increased the likelihood that participants judged the probe faces
as familiar. These behavioral ﬁndings suggest that feelings of
familiarity and corresponding overt recognition responses can
be inﬂuenced by arousal. Such evidence is consistent with many
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other lines of evidence from the cognitive neuroscience litera-
ture at large, revealing that some internal bodily changes can be
consciously experienced or “felt” (through interoceptive aware-
ness), and inﬂuence conscious decision making (Critchley and
Harrison, 2013). To the extent that abnormalities in autonomic
arousal have been proposed to be a core feature of CS, the
ﬁndings reviewed raise the possibility that overt judgments of
person recognition may also be affected by these abnormalities
in CS.
Most research and theoretical commentary on CS has focused
on person recognition in the visual modality (i.e., face recogni-
tion). However, the generation of differential autonomic responses
to famous individuals is not limited to faces but has also been
shown to accompany voice recognition (Lewis et al., 2001). Lewis
et al. (2001) reported larger SCRs for famous relative to non-
famous voices, which were of comparable magnitude to the SCR
response observed for famous versus non-famous faces in healthy
individuals. In contrast to these ﬁndings with face- and voice cues,
there is evidence to suggest that recognition of famous people
based on their names is not accompanied by a differential auto-
nomic response (Ellis et al., 1999). From this perspective, potential
impairments in overt recognition of famous people in patients
with CS, although perhaps not limited to faces, may still show
some cue speciﬁcity.
Existing experimental evidence that speaks to the extent of overt
person recognition impairments within and across modalities and
cues in CS is currently limited. Several studies that have addressed
this question by using faces of famous individuals have revealed
some impairment (Young et al., 1993; Ellis et al., 1997; Breen et al.,
2002; Lucchelli and Spinnler, 2008; Thiel et al., 2014). For exam-
ple, Ellis et al. (1997) reported that two of four patients tested
were impaired at judging whether a presented face was famous
in a yes/no recognition task, and these same two patients also
demonstrated deﬁcits in identifying the occupation of the famous
face in question. Particularly relevant to the current investigation,
Lucchelli and Spinnler (2008) used a forced-choice recognition
task to probe fame recognition in a patient with CS in asso-
ciation with an unspeciﬁed neurodegenerative condition; these
authors observed a noticeable impairment in judging which of
four faces was famous. It should be noted, however, that all of
the aforementioned studies tested person recognition using faces
only. Overt recognition of famous voices has only been exam-
ined in two individuals with CS in prior work (Reid et al., 1993;
Lewis et al., 2001), with impairments observed in both cases. At
present, it is unclear whether these impairments can be observed
together, and whether they occur against a background of normal
name recognition. Moreover, given that none of these prior stud-
ies compared performance of CS patients with that of patients of
matched etiology, but no indication of CS symptomatology, it is
also unclear whether the instances of impairment in overt person
recognition that have previously been reported are in fact speciﬁc
to CS.
A ﬁnal question regarding the scope of person recognition
impairments in CS is whether any such impairments extend
beyond person identity and include deﬁcits in overt recognition
of facial affect, i.e., facial emotional expressions. Given the pro-
posed role for abnormal autonomic responses in CS (Ellis et al.,
1997; Hirstein and Ramachandran, 1997), it is conceivable that
overt recognition of affect in others might also be impaired in
CS patients. In fact, several researchers have suggested a potential
link between the recognition of affect and the experience of affec-
tive states – a link that has been referred to as affective mimicry
(e.g., Dimberg et al., 2000; Oberman et al., 2007; Heberlein et al.,
2008; Stel and van Knippenberg, 2008). The limited research on
recognition of emotional facial expressions in patients with CS has
provided mixed results with respect to this issue. While some stud-
ies revealed no such deﬁcit (Hirstein and Ramachandran, 1997),
there are also reports of a modest deﬁcit in identifying partic-
ular emotions such as fear or disgust (Breen et al., 2002). Prior
studies typically required participants to discriminate between
different types of emotions as opposed to detecting any sign of
affect or judging the degree of emotional intensity. This is an
important distinction to make, given that recent neuropsycho-
logical research in patients with focal lesions (but without any
reported indication of CS) has shown that some prefrontal lesions
can produce deﬁcits that are only noticeable when ﬁne-grained
discrimination between subtle changes in facial expression within
a given emotion category are required (Heberlein et al., 2008;
Tsuchida and Fellows, 2012). At present, it is unknown whether
CS may be associated with deﬁcits in affect recognition of this
nature.
GOAL OF THE PRESENT STUDY
The goal of the current study was to shed more light on the nature
and extent of overt impairments in person recognition uniquely
associated with CS, focusing on the speciﬁc issues described
above. We had a unique opportunity to pursue this goal by
studying a patient with Dementia with Lewy bodies (DLB) who
showed clear signs of CS and comparing him to another patient
with DLB who did not experience CS, as well as to a group
of healthy control participants. Although the majority of CS
cases reported in the literature have been associated with psy-
chiatric illness, affective disorders, focal lesions, or traumatic
brain injury, recent epidemiological evidence suggests that CS and
other related misidentiﬁcation problems are also often seen as
part of neurodegenerative disease, with a particularly large num-
ber of cases associated with DLB (for review, see Josephs, 2007;
Harciarek and Kertesz, 2008; Devinsky, 2009; Thaipisuttikul et al.,
2013). To address the extent of overt recognition impairment in
the two DLB patients in our investigation, we administered fame-
judgments for faces, voices, and names that involved assessment
of familiarity as well as recovery of pertinent semantic knowledge.
In addition, we sought to examine whether any deﬁcits in person
recognition would include problems in recognizing facial expres-
sions of affect. To probe this ability, participants were asked to rate
the intensity of fearful expression on a series of faces that varied
in their intensity.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
DLB patients
JH (DLB w/Capgras). JH is a 79 year old male who met diagnos-
tic criteria of DLB (McKeith et al., 2005; Ferman et al., 2011) at
the time of testing. Speciﬁcally, this diagnosis was made on the
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basis of documented cognitive deﬁcits in conjunction with the
presence of well-formed visual hallucinations, spontaneous signs
of Parkinsonism (masked facies), REM sleep behavior disorder,
and neuroleptic sensitivity. Testing in the current study took place
∼1 year after the ﬁrst report of cognitive difﬁculties. The patient
had 9 years of formal education and additional vocational train-
ing. He primarily worked as a real estate sales agent prior to his
retirement in 2003. The patient’s spouse of 28 years ﬁrst noted
signs of visual misperceptions about 1 year prior to testing. For
example, JH reportedly saw a raging dog, and at another time a
woman’s face, in the chandelier of their living room. Visual mis-
perceptions also included hallucinations such as seeing a crack
in the wall that required ﬁxing. More recently he also reported
signs of auditory hallucinations, such as a buzz that he thought
was coming from an insect he could not see. First signs of CS
were noticed by JH’s spouse ∼3 months prior to testing, and
have reoccurred with considerable frequency across this period.
These misidentiﬁcations always pertain to his spouse and fol-
low the classic description of the Capgras delusion. Speciﬁcally,
these incidents are characterized by the expressed belief that his
spouse is not the person she claims to be but only looks simi-
lar to her (i.e., an imposter). When in an acute delusional state,
JH is resistant to any change in his belief and is not receptive
to rational counter-arguments or factual counter-evidence, such
as the wedding band or a wedding photograph. When his son
was present in one of the earliest instances of an acute Cap-
gras delusion, JH even asked his son how he could be so sure
that this was indeed his mother. The delusion is typically associ-
ated with some agitation and changed behavior, including active
attempts to ﬁnd his “true” spouse. It has led to many instances of
marital conﬂict. Although the fully expressed delusion most fre-
quently occurs in sleep-wake transitions and was not present at
the time of testing, JH expressed in an interview that accompa-
nied the testing session that his spouse never “feels the same” to
him the way she used to. We take this phenomenological impres-
sion as a sign of a lasting cognitive deﬁcit that is reﬂected in
the experimental ﬁndings described here. JH has also reported
misidentiﬁcations of place, speciﬁcally his home, at various times
in combination with the Capgras delusion. Curiously, even when
probed with speciﬁc cues provided by his spouse, he does not
appear to recollect any episodes in which the Capgras delusion
was acutely present. Visual inspection of a clinical magnetic reso-
nance imaging (MRI) scan (see Figure 1) by a trained radiologist
who was blind to the speciﬁc behavioral proﬁle of this patient
revealed mild atrophy of the medial frontal lobes and Sylvian
ﬁssures, with normal appearing posterior occipital and parietal
regions. With respect to medication, JH was initially placed on
a cholinesterase inhibitor (rivastigmine), and quetiapine (which
was subsequently tapered off prior to testing) to help mitigate his
delusions.
DF (DLB w/o Capgras). DF is a 73 year old male who met diag-
nostic criteria of DLB (McKeith et al., 2005; Ferman et al., 2011)
at the time of testing, which took place ∼1 month after his formal
diagnosis of DLB, and 6 years after the onset of mild cognitive
difﬁculties, as reported by his wife. He had 21 years of formal edu-
cation, having completed a Bachelor’s degree as well as a Masters
FIGURE 1 | Clinical MRI images in sagittal plane for patients JH
(above) and DF (below).There is visible atrophy in the dorsal aspects of
mPFC for JH but not DF.
of Divinity and a Doctor of Divinity. He retired from his post
as Pastor and community leader in 2008, after his spouse noted
that he had been starting to forget things. Around this time, he
also began to experience a variety of clinical symptoms includ-
ing visuo-spatial difﬁculties, left hand tremor, rigidity, disturbed
balance, REM sleep disturbances, and autonomic dysfunction,
including orthostatic hypotension andurinary urgency/frequency.
Based on a semi-structured interview conducted with his spouse,
he reported experiencing hallucinations in 2012, in which he
claimed to see and hear people and animals not currently present.
Often he would act on these hallucinations, sometimes talking
to the individuals he claimed to see. While he also experienced
some paranoid beliefs, speciﬁcally sensing “someone following
him,” these episodes were infrequent, and quickly resolved within
a minute or so. His spouse also noted isolated incidents of visual
misperceptions in DF that included, for example, mistaking their
dog for a pair of shoes. Person recognition among family mem-
bers was reported to be normal, although he sometimes apparently
failed to recognize individuals hewould have only been introduced
to recently. His spouse also mentioned that he had experienced
disorientation, and had reported difﬁculties with following direc-
tions. Furthermore, she noted changes in personality. In her view,
he had turned from a very selﬂess and compassionate person into
a somewhat selﬁsh man who complains often. In social situations,
he seemed to be unwilling to initiate or engage in any conversa-
tion unless it pertained to his immediate area of interest. Visual
inspection of a clinical MRI scan (see Figure 1) by a trained
radiologist revealed mild to moderate generalized atrophy, with
slight predominance in temporal lobes. Similar to JH, DF was also
prescribed a cholinesterase inhibitor (galantamine), and was addi-
tionally placed ondopamine (sinemet) and serotonin (citalopram)
agonists to help alleviate Parkinsonism and depressive symptoms,
respectively.
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Neuropsychological proﬁle
The results of several clinical neuropsychological tests of cognitive
functioning for both patients are presented in Table 1. In terms
of overall cognitive status as assessed using the Montreal Cogni-
tive Assessment (MoCA; Nasreddine et al., 2005), both patients
obtained scores in the range of mild cognitive impairment, with
JH scoring slightly worse than DF. Both individuals showed clear
signs of anterograde impairment in episodic memory, with the
most pronounced deﬁcits on non-verbal (visual) tasks. While JH
performed numerically worse than DF on tests of recognition
memory (Warrington word recognition; Warrington face recog-
nition), DF obtained a lower score on the Benton face recognition
test. Both patients were also impaired on perceptual tasks involv-
ing visual object processing, with particularly poor performance
on the Embedded Figures task. On tests of executive functioning,
speciﬁcally the Hayling and Brixton tests, both patients exhibited
comparable levels of impairment.
Healthy control participants
Ten control participants [all male; mean age=78.1 years
(SD = 3.28); mean education = 11.7 years (SD = 2.83)] were
recruited to participate in various aspects of the current study.
They were selected to match the patient with CS symptomatology
Table 1 | Neuropsychological profile of each patient.
Patient JH Patient DF
MoCA 21/30 24/30
Warrington face recognition
(%ile)
<5th 10th
Warrington word
recognition (%ile)
6–10th 50th
Doors and people (%ile)
People test (immediate) 84th 75th
Doors test 25th 10th
Shapes test (immediate) 2nd 5th
Names test 50th 50th
Verbal memory 75th 75th
(people + names)
Visual memory 5th <5th
(doors + shapes)
Benton face recognition 47 (normal) 37 (moderate
impairment)
Hooper visual organization
test
68 (normed score) 77 (normed score)
Embedded ﬁgures 1st quartile 1st quartile
Hayling sentence
comprehension (scaled
score)
3 (poor) 4 (low average)
Brixton spatial anticipation
test (scaled score)
1 (impaired) 1 (impaired)
(i.e., JH) in sex, age, and years of education as closely as pos-
sible. Of these 10 participants, nine individuals completed the
famous faces (Experiment 1A) and famous names (Experiment
1C) tasks, with eight participants completing the famous voices
(Experiment 1B) task as well. All ten participants completed the
fear rating task (Experiment 2). Controls were screened to ensure
the absence of current or past neurological or signiﬁcant psy-
chiatric disorders. This research project was conducted with the
approval of the Health Sciences Research Ethics Board (HSREB)
at Western University, and all participants gave written informed
consent.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Experiment 1A: famous face recognition
We created a list of 64 famous faces and 64 faces of non-famous
individuals. Famous individuals were sampled broadly so as to
increase the likelihood that they would indeed be known to study
participants. Each famous person belonged to one of three discrete
historical eras (1950 to 1969, 1970 to 1989, and 1990 to 2009) and
to one of four occupation categories (politicians, movies actors,
television actors/personalities, and athletes), with roughly equal
numbers of famous faces in each era and category. Images of
famous faces from a front view were retrieved through a Google
Image search and the Life magazine image archive1. Each famous
face was yoked with a non-famous face that was found via a
Google Image search. Non-famous faces were matched to the
famous individuals’ sex, approximate apparent age, and era. In
order to ensure a lack of fame for the non-famous faces, images
of anonymous models from advertisements and images from
out-of-country real estate brokerages, barristers, and genealog-
ical websites were used. If a name was displayed by the search
engine, we also checked that it did not point to a famous per-
son. All color images were transferred to grayscale and all images
were standardized in size to be 380 pixels in height and between
204 and 302 pixels in width. For each image, we superimposed a
white oval frame around the face to occlude scene background and
clothing.
The experiment was presented on a laptop computer using
E-prime 1.1 programming software. Participants provided the
experimenter with oral responses to each screen prompt, and the
experimenter entered numeric responses by keyboard press and
recorded any knowledge generated by participants. Trials were
presented in random order. For each trial, participants viewed
one famous face and its non-famous yoke on the screen, side by
side (see Figure 2). For 50% of all trials, the famous face was
on the left side. While the image pairs were on screen, partici-
pants verbally indicated which of the two faces they knew from
the media. Both faces remained on the screen as participants
were asked to rate their conﬁdence in their choice on a scale
of one to three, corresponding to “I am guessing,” “I think I
know, but I am not sure,” and “I am certain that I have seen
this person in the media,” respectively. Following this response,
the face selected as famous remained on the screen, and the par-
ticipant was asked to provide information (if any) they could
1http://www.life.com/search
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FIGURE 2 | Sequence of events for each trial in Experiment 1A. Experiments 1B and 1C use a similar trial structure (see text).
recall about that person, which the experimenter recorded. Par-
ticipants then completed a forced-choice occupation judgment
for the chosen individual (with the face still on the screen) from
the four different categories, and rated their conﬁdence for this
decision. There were no time restrictions for any portion of these
trials.
Experiment 1B: famous voice recognition
This taskwas administered in the same testing session as the exper-
iment on face recognition. Therefore, we created a new list of 48
famous people to avoid overlap. Identities were selected based
on criteria similar to those of Experiment 1A. Voices of famous
and non-famous people were extracted from interviews available
online (at YouTube.com) and were selected with the goal of min-
imizing any sound context. In addition, we aimed to minimize
recognition of voice based on speech content (e.g., an actor talk-
ing about his movie). Non-famous voices were extracted from
news interviews, television game shows, and documentary inter-
views. Where possible, the non-famous person’s name was veriﬁed
as not being associated with any fame. Prior to testing, pilot work
was conducted based on transcripts of all voice clips to ensure
that participants could not identify the famous person based on
content. Voice clips were edited in Audacity 1.3. Extraneous noise,
distortion, andnon-verbal vocalizationswere removed or reduced.
Due to the age of some voice clips, we also matched non-famous
clips on sound quality to assure that the voice pairs had equal
levels of distortion that might hint at a particular era. Pairs of
voice clips were matched in length within 1 s. Voice clips varied
in duration between 7 and 12 s, with a mean duration of 8.71 s
(SD = 1.29).
The trial structure for the famous voices taskwas comparable to
that for the famous faces task in Experiment 1A. Members of pairs
of famous and non-famous voices were presented sequentially and
order varied across trials. Participants listened to the voice clips
through the speakers on a laptop. Participants were alerted to any
upcoming trial with the prompt, “Ready?” For 50% of the tri-
als, the ﬁrst voice was that of the famous person. Participants
were prompted to decide which of the two voices belonged to a
famous person. Participants were offered an option to replay the
two voice clips as often as they wished. Following the famous voice
decision, participants were asked to rate their conﬁdence in their
decision. Following semantic knowledge generation, participants
heard the selected voice clip once more and were then prompted
to make a forced-choice occupation decision followed by a conﬁ-
dence judgment for that decision. At the conclusion of each trial,
participants had the option to take a momentary break prior to
the next trial.
Experiment 1C: famous name recognition
The names of the famous individuals from the famous faces task
were used as famous names in the current task. This approach
allowed for a direct comparison of recognition performance across
modalities while maintaining equivalent demands in semantic
knowledge. To minimize any carry-over effects, testing of names
and faces was separated by at least a 1 week delay in all study
participants. Non-famous ﬁrst and last name combinations were
generated to match each famous name for syllable count and
name frequency based on the 1990 US Census Database2. First
names were matched for gender. If either the ﬁrst or last name of a
famous person did not occur in the 1990 US census database, then
genealogical web sites pertaining to the name’s origin were con-
sulted and a non-famous name was generated such that it matched
the syllable count of its famous counterpart (e.g., “Marenka
Koupilova” was a non-famous corresponding item to “Martina
Navratilova”). We conﬁrmed that there was no level of fame asso-
ciated with these names by performing Google and Wikipedia
searches.
The trial structure in this experiment was identical to that of
the Famous Faces task, except that each face stimulus was replaced
by a name presented as text.
Experiment 2: fear expression rating
Stimuli consisted of colored images of faces taken from the
Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database (KDEF) as well as
2http://www.census.gov/genealogy/names/names_ﬁles.html
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the NimStim Emotional Face Stimuli database (Lundqvist et al.,
1998; Tottenham et al., 2009). All faces were cropped down to a
speciﬁc oval template, including the forehead, eyes, nose, mouth,
and full jaw, while leaving out hair, jewellery, and ears. All face
stimuli were surrounded by a rectangular background of Gaus-
sian noise. The faces were binned according to the intensity of the
fearful expressions into low (14 faces), moderate (15 faces), and
high (16 faces) groups, as established by previous ratings from
an independent sample of participants. During each trial, partic-
ipants ﬁxated on a central cross for a period of 2000 ms, followed
by a 1500 ms presentation of the face. After 1500 ms, a rating
scale appeared below the face (which remained on the screen).
Participants were asked to judge how fearful the depicted expres-
sion was on a 6-point scale, with 0 representing “no fear” and 6
representing “very fearful.” Judgments were made in a self-paced
manner.
RESULTS
To compare recognition performance of each patient to that of
healthy age-matched control participants, we used Crawford’s
modiﬁed t-test (Crawford and Howell, 1998) for all comparisons.
This test statistic is often preferred over the standard t-statistic
when the performance of a single patient is being compared to
that of a small control sample, as it corrects for potential bias in
parameter estimates of the population standard deviation that is
inherent to small samples. It should be noted that this statisti-
cal test is generally considered to be conservative in establishing
abnormalities.
EXPERIMENT 1A: FAMOUS FACE RECOGNITION
The mean proportion of correct responses for famous face recog-
nition judgments for all participants is depicted in Figure 3.
Comparing this proportion for patient JH and controls revealed a
marked impairment, t(8) = 2.90, p = 0.01 (one-tailed), d = 3.06.
In contrast, patient DF’s performance was comparable to that of
controls, t(8) = 0.83, p = 0.43, d = 0.87, with no observable
impairment. To evaluate participants’ conﬁdence for recognition
judgments, we calculated the proportion of “certain” responses
made for all recognition decisions. We found that JH tended to
give fewer “certain” responses relative to controls, t(8) = 1.74,
FIGURE 3 | Accuracy for two alternative forced-choice (2-AFC) fame recognition judgments, corresponding occupation judgments, and semantic
knowledge generation for famous faces in Experiment 1A. Gray bar represents the mean of controls. *p < 0.05 for JH relative to controls.
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p = 0.06 (one-tailed), d = 1.83, with DF performing in the
normal range, t(8) = 1.20, p = 0.27, d = 1.26. In fact, JH
responded with “certain” only twice across all trials, whereas the
mean number in controls was 18 (out of 64 trials). To examine
the extent to which participants were able to provide accurate
semantic information about correctly chosen famous faces, we
calculated the proportion of such famous faces for which any cor-
rect semantic information could be generated. Again, we found
that JH’s performance was impaired, as he produced seman-
tic information to fewer of the correctly chosen famous faces,
t(8) = 3.94, p = 0.002 (one-tailed), d = 4.16. Again, DF did
not differ from control participants on this measure, t(8) = 1.21,
p = 0.26, d = 1.28. The same pattern of performance across par-
ticipants emerged when we examined the proportion of accurate
forced-choice occupation judgments for correctly chosen famous
faces, with JH, t(8) = 2.37, p = 0.023 (one-tailed), d = 2.50,
but not DF, t(8) = 0.87, p = 0.80, d = 0.92, being impaired
relative to controls. Finally, JH t(8) = 1.73, p = 0.06 (one-
tailed), d = 1.83, but not DF t(8) = 0.25, p = 0.81, d = 0.27,
showed reduced conﬁdence in these occupation judgments, as
reﬂected in the proportion of “certain” response given across all
trials.
EXPERIMENT 1B: FAMOUS VOICE RECOGNITION
The mean proportion of correct responses for famous-face recog-
nition judgments for all participants is depicted in Figure 4. In
comparing the proportionof correct famedecisions based on voice
cues for patients and controls, we found that JH (0.52) exhibited an
impairment, t(7) = 2.25, p = 0.02 (one-tailed), d = 2.39, while DF
(0.65) performed in the normal range (M = 0.71), t(7) = 0.81,
p = 0.44, d = 0.86. Given that the overall level of performance
and conﬁdence for fame judgments was lower for all participants
with voice cues, we collapsed “certain” and “not sure” responses
to obtain an index of high conﬁdence for fame judgments. Again,
JH (0.00) tended to exhibit less conﬁdence than healthy controls
(M= 0.32), t(7)= 1.58, p = 0.07 (one-tailed), d = 1.67, whileDF’s
conﬁdence (0.06) did not differ, t(7) = 1.24, p = 0.24, d = 1.35. In
terms of semantic knowledge, the proportion of correctly selected
famous voices forwhich JH(0.00) could recall any correct semantic
information was smaller than that of controls as well (M = 0.33),
t(7) = 1.98, p = 0.04 (one-tailed), d = 2.10. By contrast, DF
was able to retrieve semantic information for a similar propor-
tion (0.16) of correctly selected voices as controls, t(7) = 1.00,
p = 0.35, d = 1.06. When we examined the proportion of accurate
forced-choice occupation judgments for correctly selected famous
FIGURE 4 | Accuracy for two alternative forced-choice (2-AFC) fame recognition judgments, corresponding occupation judgments, and semantic
knowledge generation for famous voices in Experiment 1B. Gray bar represents the mean of controls. *p < 0.05 for JH relative to controls.
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voices, neither JH, t(7) = 0.75, p = 0.24 (one-tailed), d = 0.80,
nor DF, t(7) = 0.02, p = 0.99, d = 0.02, differed from controls.
However, this result must be interpreted with caution given the
overall low level of performance (see Figure 3). As with faces, we
found that JH’s, t(7) = 2.07, p = 0.039 (one-tailed), d = 2.19, but
not DF’s, t(7) = 1.55, p = 0.16, d = 1.65, conﬁdence in occupation
judgments was reduced.
EXPERIMENT 1C: FAMOUS NAME RECOGNITION
The mean proportion of correct responses for famous-name
recognition judgments is depicted in Figure 5. Notably, JH cor-
rectly recognized a similar proportion of famous names as control
participants on this task, t(8) = 0.45, p = 0.66, d = 0.47, with
DF also showing no signs of impairments in recognition accu-
racy, t(8) = 1.21, p = 0.26, d = 1.27. Conﬁdence for correctly
selected names was evaluated by comparing the proportion of
“certain” responses made for each trial. JH demonstrated similar
levels of conﬁdence as controls, t(8) = 0.32, p = 0.75, d = 0.34,
as did DF, t(8) = 0.63, p = 0.54, d = 0.67. The proportion of
famous names for which any correct semantic information was
generated was similar for JH and controls, t(8) = 1.07, p = 0.31,
d = 1.13, as well as for DF and controls, t(8) = 0.84, p = 0.43,
d = 0.89. Similarly, we found no evidence of impairment for
the forced-choice occupation judgments for correctly selected
famous names provided by either JH, t(8) = 1.61, p = 0.15,
d = 1.70, or DF, t(8) = 0.37, p = 0.72, d = 0.39. Finally, con-
ﬁdence in these occupation judgments did not differ between
JH and controls, t(8) = 0.36, p = 0.73, d = 0.38, nor DF and
controls, t(8) = 0.51, p = 0.62, d = 0.54. Together, there was
no indication of abnormalities in person recognition based on
names in either patient. An important aspect of these results,
then, is that JH could recognize the names of the same individ-
uals whose face he could not recognize accurately in Experiment
1A. As an aside, we also note that this preservation of seman-
tically based name-recognition contrasts with JH’s deﬁcits on
neuropsychological tasks of episodic memory for words. This lat-
ter dissociation is in line with many prior ﬁndings demonstrating
independence between deﬁcits in episodic versus semantic mem-
ory (e.g., Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997; Hodges and Graham, 2001;
Tulving, 2002).
FIGURE 5 | Accuracy for two alternative forced-choice (2-AFC) fame recognition judgments, corresponding occupation judgments, and semantic
knowledge generation for famous names in Experiment 1C. Gray bar represents the mean of controls.
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EXPERIMENT 2: FEAR EXPRESSION RATING
Our primary interest for this task was to determine whether JH’s
perceived intensity of emotional expression differed from that of
controls in terms of its coupling with manipulated (i.e., depicted)
intensity. To this end, we performed a linear trend analysis in
each patient and in healthy control participants. Healthy con-
trols exhibited a signiﬁcant linear trend, t(9) = 4.02, p = 0.002,
d = 1.29, with fear ratings being positively related to the intensity
of the fearful expression (see Figure 6). Patient DF also exhibited
a similar linear trend, F(1,42) = 21.0, p< 0.001, R2contrast = 0.33.
By contrast, patient JH did not exhibit a signiﬁcant linear trend,
F(1,42) = 1.39, p = 0.25, R2contrast = 0.032, suggesting that his
perceived fear intensity was decoupled from the depicted intensity
level.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current case study aimed to examine the scope of overt
person recognition impairments associatedwithCS inDLB, focus-
ing on both the recognition of identity and affect as conveyed
through facial expressions. Experiment 1 probed recognition of
person identity across three types of cues (faces, voices, and
names, respectively) with two alternative forced-choice (2-AFC)
fame judgments. Relative to healthy age-matched controls, the
DLB patient with CS (JH), but not the patient without CS (DF),
exhibited an impairment in recognizing famous faces and voices.
JH also showed reduced conﬁdence in these judgments and was
found to be impaired at accessing pertinent semantic knowledge
in response to face and voice cues; speciﬁcally, he generated fewer
semantic facts, and was less accurate in judging the occupation
of correctly chosen famous faces and voices. This pattern of
results stands in contrast to the pattern we observed when per-
son recognition was probed with names. Here, JH performed as
well as DF and healthy controls and showed normal levels of con-
ﬁdence in his fame judgments. There was also no evidence of
FIGURE 6 | Mean fear intensity ratings for fearful faces. Error bars
represent the standard error of the mean for control participants.
any semantic impairment with name cues. Together, these results
reveal noticeable cue-speciﬁc deﬁcits in overt recognition of per-
son identity that are associated with CS. In Experiment 2, we
also found evidence for impairments in overt judgments of facial
expressions. Unlike DF and healthy controls, JH provided fear
ratings that did not vary with the depicted intensity of fearful
expression.
According to what is perhaps the most prominent account of
the Capgras delusion in the current literature, perceptual repre-
sentations of familiar faces are decoupled from the appropriate
affective signals that imbue faces with a “glow” as a marker of
familiarity (Hirstein and Ramachandran, 1997; Breen et al., 2000;
Ellis and Lewis, 2001; Young, 2008). Given extant evidence that
points to a role for autonomic signals in person recognition
beyond spouses and close relatives (Stone et al., 2001; Vico et al.,
2010; Guerra et al., 2012), and given the previously reported
inﬂuences of arousal on overt recognition memory judgments
(Goldinger and Hansen, 2005; Morris et al., 2008; Duke et al.,
2014)wepredicted thatCSwould be associatedwith subtle impair-
ments in overt recognition of people other than those targeted by
the delusion. Indeed, we found evidence for such impairments
in fame judgments based on faces and voices, with a preserva-
tion of name recognition. Inasmuch as prior research suggested
that autonomic responses (as measured with SCR) are associated
with recognizing faces and voices (Ellis et al., 1997; Hirstein and
Ramachandran, 1997; Lewis et al., 2001) but not names (Ellis
et al., 1999), the behavioral dissociation we observed is consis-
tent with the presence of abnormal autonomic arousal signals
in JH. As such, it is also consistent with past research ﬁndings
pointing to autonomic dysfunction inDLB (e.g., Thaisetthawatkul
et al., 2004). We acknowledge, however, that we can only claim
consistency given that we did not include psychophysiological
measurements of autonomic responses in our experiments. Nev-
ertheless, the fact that we observed this behavioral dissociation
even though recognition of the same famous individuals was
probed with face- and name cues, suggests that it is clearly not
an amodal representation of person knowledge that is impaired in
patient JH.
As noted in the Introduction, prior research that systematically
addressed overt person recognition in CS is scarce. The handful
of studies relevant to this issue have, in their majority, docu-
mented hints of impairment when famous faces were used as cues
(Young et al., 1993; Ellis et al., 1997; Lewis et al., 2001; Lucchelli
and Spinnler, 2008; Thiel et al., 2014, but see Breen et al., 2002).
The tasks employed to probe person recognition and the etiol-
ogy that caused CS, however, differed considerably across studies.
Given the etiology of JH’s neurological condition, the ﬁndings
reported by Lucchelli and Spinnler (2008) appear most relevant.
These authors examined a patient in whom CS was associated
with a neurodegenerative condition (of unknown origin). Like
patient JH in the current study, the individual exhibited marked
impairments in making forced-choice fame judgments for faces.
Curiously, when the name of the famous individual was presented
as an additional cue, the patient was able to use this information
to select the famous face among the different alternatives. Thus,
in line with the current ﬁndings, these prior results also point
to some preservation of name-recognition abilities in CS. This
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preservationmayholdutility in developing rehabilitative strategies
aimed atmitigating the person recognition difﬁculties expressed in
other modalities (i.e., faces, voices; see Cousins, 2013, for potential
directions).
The majority of past studies that probed person recognition in
CS have relied on tests involving faces as cues. To our knowledge,
only one study addressed both face and voice recognition in the
same patient (Lewis et al., 2001). These authors reported a case
with voice-speciﬁc CS who was impaired in recognizing famous
voices only, and whose autonomic abnormalities captured with
psychophysiological recordings were also limited to voices. Such
ﬁndings could suggest that the proposed disconnection between
perceptual person representations and affective responses in CS
does not always affect multiple modalities. The speciﬁc nature and
extent of the structural lesion that is present in any given case of CS
will likely determine whether the functional deﬁcit affects person
recognition based on one or more modalities and types of cues.
In DLB, the modality in which hallucinations and/or mispercep-
tions occur may be predictive as to whether person recognition
impairments will be uni- or multi-modal. While visual hallucina-
tions appear to be present in all cases of CS associated with DLB,
reported auditory hallucinations are more variable (Ferman and
Boeve,2007; Josephs,2007; Thaipisuttikul et al.,2013). Against this
background, it is informative that JH experienced hallucinations
in both modalities at the time of testing.
Given the central importance of the distinction between overt
and covert responses in the literature on CS and prosopagnosia, an
important issue to consider is whether the tasks we used to probe
recognition of famous faces and voices in the current study do
indeed reveal impairments inovert, i.e., conscious, person recogni-
tion. In experimental research on recognition memory conducted
with study-test paradigms, it has been argued convincingly that
performance on forced-choice tasks does not always rely on con-
scious access to stored information, and that implicit memory
processes can sometimes drive behavioral responses (Voss et al.,
2008; Paller et al., 2009; Dew and Cabeza, 2011; see also Bowles
and Köhler, 2014 for discussion in relation to fame judgments). By
this view, the recognition impairments we observed in association
with CS in the present study could be seen as a covert expres-
sion of the presumed deﬁcit in autonomic responding. There is
other evidence in the current set of ﬁndings, however, that speaks
against such an account. Critically, JH’s forced-choice recognition
accuracy for fame judgments was related to his expressed conﬁ-
dence in the judgments. Speciﬁcally, the recognition deﬁcits we
observed for faces and voices, unlike the preserved recognition
judgments for famous names, were associated with reduced lev-
els of subjective conﬁdence in the corresponding fame decisions
when compared to healthy participants. Such a correspondence
between subjective conﬁdence and objective accuracy is typically
interpreted as evidence that argues for a role of conscious aware-
ness in the decisions at hand (see Dienes, 2008; Bowles and
Köhler, 2014, for further rationale). As such, it suggests that
the impairment we observed does indeed extend to overt per-
son recognition. That we also observed noticeable deﬁcits in the
generation of semantic knowledge in response to face and voice
cues, but again not names, provides further strong support for this
interpretation.
In the present study, we also found impairments in the
perception of affective information as conveyed through facial
expressions in patient JH. Prior research on this issue in other
CS cases has provided somewhat equivocal ﬁndings, with a hand-
ful of studies reporting no deﬁcit (Hirstein and Ramachandran,
1997; Lucchelli and Spinnler, 2008; Thiel et al., 2014) and others
revealing modest deﬁcits in (Young et al., 1993; Breen et al., 2002).
While differing etiologies could at least in part account for these
mixed results, and for discrepancies with the current ﬁndings,
differences in the type of affective judgments employed warrant
particular consideration. The method used in prior studies that
revealed no impairment in association with CS (Young et al., 1993;
Hirstein and Ramachandran, 1997; Breen et al., 2002; Thiel et al.,
2014) required participants to identify the category of emotional
expression depicted (e.g., fear versus happiness). By contrast, in
the current study, we revealed deﬁcits by asking participants to
rate the intensity of the emotion displayed within a given category,
speciﬁcally fear. Recent neuropsychological evidence suggests that
neural mechanisms in prefrontal cortex that support ﬁne-grained
intensity judgments can be dissociated from those that allow for
discrimination between different categories. In particular, the for-
mer but not the latter type of affective judgment has been shown
to be impaired following damage to vmPFC (Heberlein et al., 2008;
Tsuchida and Fellows, 2012), a cortical region that has also been
implicated in the control of autonomic responses in prior research
(Tranel and Damasio, 1994; Bechara et al., 1999; Critchley et al.,
2003; Williams et al., 2005; Medford and Critchley, 2010). We note
that clinical visual inspection of MRI scans revealed atrophy in
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in JH. Thus, it is possible that
the deﬁcit in overt recognition of affect intensity we observed
in JH is related to the abnormal autonomic responses in person
recognition that have informed much research on CS over the
past two decades. Evidence to support such a link comes from
research in healthy individuals showing that affect intensity judg-
ments for faces are sensitive to interoceptive cues that arise from
afferent cardiovascular feedback (Gray et al., 2007, 2012). Future
research with psychophysiological recordings could address the
proposed relationship between deﬁcits in these domains in CS
more directly.
Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of CS is that patients’ delu-
sions are restricted to one individual who always shares close
emotional bonds with the patient, most frequently the spouse.
Given the recognition impairments for famous faces and voices
that were associated with CS in the present study, one might
wonder why the patients’ delusions do not include other per-
sonally familiar or famous individuals. In order to answer this
question, it is helpful to consider models that attribute delusions
to noisy prediction error signals that engender false inferences
(Kapur, 2003; Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Corlett et al., 2010 but see
Grifﬁths et al., 2014 for current limitations). These models adopt
a Bayesian framework that emphasizes the role of expectation
in guiding perception and inference, and suggest that delusions
may arise when current experience is deemed inconsistent with
prior expectations. In the case of CS, autonomic dysfunction has
been proposed to be associated with a phenomenological experi-
ence that differs from the one the patients would have typically
had for many years in interactions with their spouse or loved
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ones, and that would therefore produce a salient prediction error;
adopting the belief that the spouse is an imposter could resolve
this mismatch between expectation and experience (Young, 2008;
Corlett et al., 2010). In this account, the speciﬁcity of the patients’
delusions may arise because encountering a loved one is asso-
ciated with a much stronger expectation of an accompanying
autonomic signal than encountering other familiar individuals.
Indeed, recent psychophysiological evidence has shown that affec-
tive responses to loved ones are associated with greater arousal
and positive valence than those to other familiar individuals (i.e.,
famous people), asmeasured by SCRs and zygomaticmuscle activ-
ity, respectively (Vico et al., 2010; Guerra et al., 2011). Moreover,
these psychophysiological measures have also been shown to be
greater for romantic partners as compared to family members
(e.g., parents).
A critical aspect of the design of the current study was that
we compared a patient with CS to another individual who did
not report CS, but suffered from the same type of neurological
condition, i.e., DLB. We included this comparison in an effort to
reveal impairments that are uniquely associated with CS, while
aiming to control for other cognitive and behavioral effects that
are associated with DLB more broadly (see Collerton et al., 2003;
Metzler-Baddeley, 2007; Johns et al., 2009, for review). This type
of comparison seems particularly important when testing patients
with neurodegenerative conditions, which are known to affect
cognitive functioning more broadly than focal lesions (see Jedidi
et al., 2013 for similar design in a single-case study on CS in
Alzheimer’s disease). Although the results from the present single-
case study clearly advance our understanding of the nature of
person recognition impairments associated with CS, we recog-
nize that further research will be needed to examine the extent to
which they generalize to other CS patients with DLB and other
etiologies.
We note that although the two DLB patients tested here were
well matched in terms of general level of cognitive functioning,
as reﬂected in their MOCA scores, there were noticeable differ-
ences in formal education. It seems unlikely, however, that these
differences in educational background could account for the dif-
ferences in person recognition we observed between these two
individuals, given that JH was able to accurately recognize the
names of the same famous individuals for whom his face recog-
nition was poor. This result suggests that JH does indeed possess
intact semantic representations of the individuals in question, but
that he was unable to access these representations when presented
with faces. In addition, two of the healthy age-matched control
participants tested here shared the same level of formal education
as JH. Given that one of them was the most accurate of the control
participants in recognizing famous faces, with the other perform-
ing similar to DF in the middle range, it seems unlikely that level
of education is a critical determinant of high performance in this
task. It is also not clear how reference to educational background
could explain why impairments in recognition of affect inten-
sity were present only in JH and not DF, as this task employs
subjective ratings and does not depend heavily upon knowledge
acquired through formal education. In a similar vein, we also
note that the two patients did not differ in their neuropsycholog-
ical test scores of face recognition and visual object processing.
Accordingly, we argue that the differences between both patients,
in terms of the presence of CS and associated cognitive deﬁcits,
reﬂect variability that is the result of differential vulnerability of
different brain regions toDLB pathology across individuals, a con-
clusion that is also supported by the clinical MRI data presented
here.
Recent ﬁndings from a large-scale neuroimaging study on the
neural correlates of psychotic symptoms in DLB speak to the link
between atrophy in different cortical regions and variability in
behavioral proﬁle (Nagahama et al., 2010). One of the regions that
showed hypo-perfusion in relation to the presence of misiden-
tiﬁcation syndromes in the sample of patients examined was the
insular cortex. This ﬁnding is of particular relevance to the current
investigation given that the anterior insula, together with mPFC
and regions of the anterior cingulate cortex, have been implicated
in the control of autonomic functions and in interoceptive aware-
ness (see Critchley andHarrison, 2013, for recent review), andmay
be related to the pattern of mPFC atrophy observed in patient JH.
On another level, this atrophy and the reported presence of a con-
sistent patterns of hypo-perfusion across multiple DLB patients
with misidentiﬁcation syndromes (Nagahama et al., 2010) lends
support to the notion that, although the critical delusion that
deﬁnes CS may not be continuously present, there are lasting neu-
ropathological changes that underlie the cognitive abnormalities
that are unique to CS, and that may be necessary for the acute
expression of this delusion.
Taken together, the ﬁndings reported in the present inves-
tigation demonstrate that deﬁcits in person recognition associ-
ated with CS extend to persons that are not targeted by the
delusion. Interestingly, these impairments were observable in
overt recognition judgments, and pertained not only to recog-
nition of identity but also to recognition of affect intensity.
While we have emphasized that this overall pattern of results
can be accommodated, and even be predicted, based on theo-
ries that place deﬁcits in autonomic responding to perceptual
person cues at the core of CS, our ﬁndings of impairments
in overt judgments also point to a potential role for abnor-
malities in interoceptive awareness in CS. One possibility that
deserves consideration in future research conducted with psy-
chophysiological recordings is that some patients with CS may
in fact only have a deﬁcit at the level of interoceptive aware-
ness, rather than the generation of autonomic responses to person
cues. Regardless of the outcome of such future research, the
present demonstration of overt recognition deﬁcits suggests that
CS does not always represent a mirror-image of the deﬁcits in
person recognition that are typically present in patients with
prosopagnosia (see Behrmann and Plaut, 2013, for review). As
such, the present ﬁndings also point to a functional organiza-
tion of person recognition processes in the human mind and
brain that may be more dynamic than previously thought, and
include behaviorally relevant interactions between covert and
overt processes.
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